FedRAMP High Deployment — Cloud Air-Gap Without USB
The Misconception
"Air-gap" for FedRAMP High doesn't mean physically disconnected. It means:
- No unauthorized egress — workloads can't phone home to arbitrary internet endpoints
- Controlled ingress — only authorized traffic from authorized sources
- Data sovereignty — data stays within the FedRAMP authorization boundary
- Supply chain control — all software artifacts verified and auditable
AWS GovCloud, Azure Government, and GCP Assured Workloads provide this. You never touch a USB drive.
How It Actually Works (No USB)
Arivaran Commercial Hub FedRAMP Authorization Boundary
(SOC 2, commercial cloud) (GovCloud / Azure Gov / GCP Assured)
┌──────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│ Harbor Registry │ │ │
│ (images, charts) │─── IPsec ──→│ ECR/ACR/GAR (mirror) │
│ │ VPN or │ All images scanned + signed │
│ Hub API │ PrivateLink│ │
│ (bootstrap, PKI) │────────────→│ Satellite (EKS/AKS/GKE) │
│ │ │ step-ca (local PKI) │
│ │ │ CNPG+Citus (RDS or self-mgd) │
│ │ │ S3/Blob/GCS (local storage) │
│ │ │ KuiperDesk services │
│ │ │ │
│ │←── IPsec ───│ Heartbeat + metrics only │
│ │ (metadata │ (no backup data crosses boundary)│
│ │ only) │ │
└──────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────────────┘
Cloud-Specific Transfer Mechanisms (No USB)
AWS GovCloud
| Mechanism | Use Case | How |
|---|
| ECR Cross-Account Replication | Container images | Push to commercial ECR → auto-replicate to GovCloud ECR. No manual transfer. |
| S3 Cross-Region Replication | Helm charts, agent binaries | S3 in commercial → replicate to GovCloud S3 bucket |
| AWS PrivateLink | Hub → satellite API calls | Private connectivity, no internet traversal |
| AWS Transit Gateway | Network peering | Connect commercial VPC to GovCloud VPC |
| AWS Transfer Family | Bulk data transfer | SFTP/FTPS for large artifact bundles |
| Snowball Edge | True air-gap (SCIF) | Physical device only for IL5/IL6 |
# values-fedramp-high-aws.yaml
cloud:
provider: aws
region: us-gov-west-1 # GovCloud region
fipsEndpoints: true # Use FIPS 140-2 validated endpoints
registry:
# ECR in GovCloud (replicated from commercial Harbor)
host: "<account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-gov-west-1.amazonaws.com"
mirror:
source: "registry.arivaran.ai"
target: "<govcloud-ecr>"
replicationType: cross-account # automatic, no USB
pki:
provider: step-ca # local CA, not Let's Encrypt
# ACM Private CA also available on GovCloud (FedRAMP authorized)
# But step-ca gives us full control
stepCA:
enabled: true
fipsMode: true # step-ca compiled with FIPS Go crypto
storage:
backend: aws-s3
s3:
bucket: "kuiperdesk-<tenant>-govcloud"
kmsKeyArn: "arn:aws-us-gov:kms:..." # GovCloud KMS
encryption: aws:kms # SSE-KMS (FIPS 140-2 Level 3)
objectLock: true # WORM for compliance retention
database:
backend: rds
rds:
instanceClass: db.r6g.large
engine: aurora-postgresql
engineVersion: "15.4"
encrypted: true
kmsKeyArn: "arn:aws-us-gov:kms:..."
fipsEndpoint: true
multiAz: true # HA within GovCloud region
networking:
# PrivateLink from commercial hub → GovCloud satellite
hubConnection: privatelink
privateLink:
serviceName: "com.amazonaws.vpce.us-gov-west-1.vpce-svc-xxx"
# No network overlay needed — PrivateLink provides private connectivity
Azure Government
| Mechanism | Use Case | How |
|---|
| ACR Geo-Replication | Container images | Push to commercial ACR → geo-replicate to Azure Gov ACR |
| Azure Private Link | Hub → satellite API | Private connectivity across tenants |
| Azure ExpressRoute | Dedicated connection | Private peering between commercial and gov |
| Azure Blob Replication | Charts, binaries | Object replication across regions |
# values-fedramp-high-azure.yaml
cloud:
provider: azure
region: usgovvirginia # Azure Government region
registry:
host: "<registry>.azurecr.us" # Azure Gov ACR
database:
backend: azure-postgresql
azurePostgres:
sku: GP_Standard_D2s_v3
encrypted: true
geoRedundantBackup: true
storage:
backend: azure-blob
azureBlob:
accountName: "kuiperdesk<tenant>gov"
encryption: microsoft-managed # or customer-managed HSM keys
immutableStorage: true # legal hold / time-based retention
GCP Assured Workloads
| Mechanism | Use Case | How |
|---|
| Artifact Registry Replication | Container images | Push to commercial → replicate to Assured project |
| VPC Service Controls | Data boundary | Prevents data exfiltration at API level |
| Private Service Connect | Hub → satellite | Private connectivity |
| Cloud KMS (FIPS 140-2 L3) | Encryption keys | HSM-backed keys |
True Air-Gap (USB Required — IL5/IL6/SCIF Only)
USB sneakernet is ONLY needed for:
- IL5/IL6 (Impact Level 5/6) — classified environments
- SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) — no network at all
- Submarine/ship — literally disconnected
- Field deployment — military forward operating base
For these, the USB/ISO bundle from our air-gap policy applies. But this is <1% of FedRAMP deployments.
How This Eases FedRAMP High Certification
What Auditors Check (and How We Pass)
| NIST 800-53 Control | What Auditors Want | What We Provide |
|---|
| AC-2 Account management | Centralized identity | Keycloak on satellite (own realm, own user store) |
| AC-17 Remote access | Controlled, encrypted | PrivateLink / IPsec only — no public internet |
| AU-2/AU-3 Audit events | Complete audit trail | Every API call logged, immutable audit table in Citus |
| CA-3 System interconnections | Documented, authorized | Hub ↔ satellite ISA documented, only metadata crosses |
| CM-2 Baseline config | Reproducible, versioned | Helm chart = deterministic, values-fedramp.yaml = config baseline |
| CM-7 Least functionality | Minimal services | Only KuiperDesk services, no extras, network policies enforce |
| IA-2 Identification | MFA, unique accounts | Keycloak with FIDO2/TOTP, required of every account in a FedRAMP deployment (values-fedramp.yaml); a fresh second factor before privileged dashboard actions; per-agent TPM identity |
| IA-5 Authenticator mgmt | Rotation, strength | step-ca auto-rotates, TPM non-exportable keys |
| IR-4 Incident handling | Revocation capability | Satellite CA revocable in < 60s (see PKI trust policy) |
| MP-4 Media protection | Encrypt removable media | Only for IL5+, USB bundle is encrypted + checksummed |
| PE-17 Alternate work site | Remote backup access | Satellite on customer premises, dashboard accessible locally |
| PL-4 Rules of behavior | Acceptable use | Tenant TOS + technical enforcement (network policies) |
| RA-5 Vulnerability scanning | Continuous scanning | Trivy on Harbor (pre-deployment), runtime: Tetragon |
| SA-12 Supply chain | Provenance, integrity | All images from Harbor, cosign signed, SBOM available |
| SC-7 Boundary protection | Network boundary | GovCloud VPC + PrivateLink + Cilium network policies |
| SC-8 Transmission confidentiality | Encrypt all transit | TLS 1.3 everywhere, FIPS 140-2 validated crypto |
| SC-12 Crypto key management | FIPS validated | CloudHSM root (Level 3), step-ca FIPS mode, KMS for data |
| SC-13 Cryptographic protection | FIPS algorithms | All crypto modules FIPS 140-2 validated |
| SC-28 Protection at rest | Encrypt all storage | RDS encryption (KMS), S3 SSE-KMS, EBS encryption |
| SI-7 Software integrity | Verified, signed | cosign signatures on all images, Helm chart provenance |
What We Already Have vs What's Needed
| Capability | Status | Notes |
|---|
| FIPS 140-2 crypto (agent) | Ready | AlmaLinux FIPS mode, OpenSSL FIPS provider |
| FIPS 140-2 crypto (services) | Ready | C++ services use FIPS-validated TLS |
| FIPS 140-2 crypto (CA) | Ready | CloudHSM Level 3 root, step-ca FIPS mode |
| Encryption at rest | Ready | LUKS (bare metal), KMS (cloud), Citus pgcrypto |
| Encryption in transit | Ready | TLS 1.3 everywhere, gRPC-over-TLS |
| Network boundary | Ready | Cilium policies + GovCloud VPC + PrivateLink |
| Audit logging | Ready | Immutable audit table, OTel export |
| Vulnerability scanning | Ready | Trivy + Harbor pre-deployment scan |
| Image signing | Ready | cosign via Harbor |
| Identity management | Ready | Keycloak + TPM attestation |
| CA revocation | Ready | CRL + OCSP + hub blocklist |
| Satellite isolation | Ready | Per-satellite intermediate CA, data sovereignty |
| IaC reproducibility | Ready | Helm chart + values file = deterministic baseline |
| SBOM generation | Needed | Generate per-image SBOM (Syft/Trivy) |
| POA&M tracking | Needed | Plan of Action & Milestones document |
| SSP (System Security Plan) | Needed | The actual FedRAMP documentation package |
| 3PAO assessment | Needed | Third-party assessment by accredited org |
| Continuous monitoring | Partial | Have metrics/alerts, need ConMon reporting format |
FedRAMP Certification Path
- Select sponsor — federal agency willing to use KuiperDesk (ATO sponsor)
- Engage 3PAO — accredited assessor (e.g., Coalfire, Schellman, A-LIGN)
- Prepare SSP — System Security Plan documenting all 325+ controls
- Readiness assessment — 3PAO reviews SSP + architecture
- Full assessment — 3PAO tests all controls (penetration test, config review)
- Remediate — Fix any findings
- Authorization — Agency ATO + FedRAMP PMO listing
- Continuous monitoring — Monthly vulnerability scans, annual assessment
Estimated timeline: 6-12 months from engagement to P-ATO
Estimated cost: $300K-$500K (3PAO fees + remediation effort)
Our Architectural Advantages for FedRAMP
- Satellite model = clean authorization boundary — customer data never leaves their GovCloud VPC. The hub (commercial) is a separate system with its own SOC 2.
- Helm chart = deterministic baseline — CM-2 compliance is trivial:
helm template outputs the exact expected state. - step-ca = FIPS crypto we control — no dependency on external CA (Let's Encrypt is NOT FedRAMP authorized).
- Per-satellite intermediate CA — SC-12 key management is clean: each satellite has isolated PKI, revocable from hub.
- Citus tenant isolation — even within a satellite, data is distributed by tenant_id. Multi-tenant Tier B/C satellites get row-level isolation.
- Agent TPM identity — IA-2/IA-5 authenticator management: non-exportable hardware-bound keys, auto-rotating certificates.
Revision History
| Date | Change | Author |
|---|
| 2026-03-22 | Initial — GovCloud deployment, cloud transfer mechanisms, FedRAMP control mapping, certification path | Navid Ahmadi (Compliance), Claire Dubois (Security), Tariq Hassan (Platform) |
| 2026-09-30 | IA-2: a second factor is required of every account in a FedRAMP deployment (values-fedramp.yaml, compliance.fedramp), #20984 | Engineering |