FedRAMP High Deployment Guide

Architecture overview, NIST 800-53 High control mapping, air-gap procedures.

NIST controls:Full NIST 800-53 High baseline
Last updated:2026-03-22
Category:Technical

FedRAMP High Deployment — Cloud Air-Gap Without USB

The Misconception

"Air-gap" for FedRAMP High doesn't mean physically disconnected. It means:

  • No unauthorized egress — workloads can't phone home to arbitrary internet endpoints
  • Controlled ingress — only authorized traffic from authorized sources
  • Data sovereignty — data stays within the FedRAMP authorization boundary
  • Supply chain control — all software artifacts verified and auditable

AWS GovCloud, Azure Government, and GCP Assured Workloads provide this. You never touch a USB drive.

How It Actually Works (No USB)

Arivaran Commercial Hub              FedRAMP Authorization Boundary
(SOC 2, commercial cloud)            (GovCloud / Azure Gov / GCP Assured)

┌──────────────────────┐             ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│ Harbor Registry      │             │                                  │
│ (images, charts)     │─── IPsec ──→│ ECR/ACR/GAR (mirror)            │
│                      │  VPN or     │   All images scanned + signed   │
│ Hub API              │  PrivateLink│                                  │
│ (bootstrap, PKI)     │────────────→│ Satellite (EKS/AKS/GKE)        │
│                      │             │   step-ca (local PKI)           │
│                      │             │   CNPG+Citus (RDS or self-mgd) │
│                      │             │   S3/Blob/GCS (local storage)   │
│                      │             │   KuiperDesk services           │
│                      │             │                                  │
│                      │←── IPsec ───│ Heartbeat + metrics only        │
│                      │  (metadata  │ (no backup data crosses boundary)│
│                      │   only)     │                                  │
└──────────────────────┘             └──────────────────────────────────┘

Cloud-Specific Transfer Mechanisms (No USB)

AWS GovCloud

MechanismUse CaseHow
ECR Cross-Account ReplicationContainer imagesPush to commercial ECR → auto-replicate to GovCloud ECR. No manual transfer.
S3 Cross-Region ReplicationHelm charts, agent binariesS3 in commercial → replicate to GovCloud S3 bucket
AWS PrivateLinkHub → satellite API callsPrivate connectivity, no internet traversal
AWS Transit GatewayNetwork peeringConnect commercial VPC to GovCloud VPC
AWS Transfer FamilyBulk data transferSFTP/FTPS for large artifact bundles
Snowball EdgeTrue air-gap (SCIF)Physical device only for IL5/IL6
# values-fedramp-high-aws.yaml
cloud:
  provider: aws
  region: us-gov-west-1              # GovCloud region
  fipsEndpoints: true                 # Use FIPS 140-2 validated endpoints

registry:
  # ECR in GovCloud (replicated from commercial Harbor)
  host: "<account-id>.dkr.ecr.us-gov-west-1.amazonaws.com"
  mirror:
    source: "registry.arivaran.ai"
    target: "<govcloud-ecr>"
    replicationType: cross-account    # automatic, no USB

pki:
  provider: step-ca                   # local CA, not Let's Encrypt
  # ACM Private CA also available on GovCloud (FedRAMP authorized)
  # But step-ca gives us full control
  stepCA:
    enabled: true
    fipsMode: true                    # step-ca compiled with FIPS Go crypto

storage:
  backend: aws-s3
  s3:
    bucket: "kuiperdesk-<tenant>-govcloud"
    kmsKeyArn: "arn:aws-us-gov:kms:..."  # GovCloud KMS
    encryption: aws:kms               # SSE-KMS (FIPS 140-2 Level 3)
    objectLock: true                   # WORM for compliance retention

database:
  backend: rds
  rds:
    instanceClass: db.r6g.large
    engine: aurora-postgresql
    engineVersion: "15.4"
    encrypted: true
    kmsKeyArn: "arn:aws-us-gov:kms:..."
    fipsEndpoint: true
    multiAz: true                      # HA within GovCloud region

networking:
  # PrivateLink from commercial hub → GovCloud satellite
  hubConnection: privatelink
  privateLink:
    serviceName: "com.amazonaws.vpce.us-gov-west-1.vpce-svc-xxx"
  # No network overlay needed — PrivateLink provides private connectivity

Azure Government

MechanismUse CaseHow
ACR Geo-ReplicationContainer imagesPush to commercial ACR → geo-replicate to Azure Gov ACR
Azure Private LinkHub → satellite APIPrivate connectivity across tenants
Azure ExpressRouteDedicated connectionPrivate peering between commercial and gov
Azure Blob ReplicationCharts, binariesObject replication across regions
# values-fedramp-high-azure.yaml
cloud:
  provider: azure
  region: usgovvirginia               # Azure Government region

registry:
  host: "<registry>.azurecr.us"       # Azure Gov ACR

database:
  backend: azure-postgresql
  azurePostgres:
    sku: GP_Standard_D2s_v3
    encrypted: true
    geoRedundantBackup: true

storage:
  backend: azure-blob
  azureBlob:
    accountName: "kuiperdesk<tenant>gov"
    encryption: microsoft-managed      # or customer-managed HSM keys
    immutableStorage: true             # legal hold / time-based retention

GCP Assured Workloads

MechanismUse CaseHow
Artifact Registry ReplicationContainer imagesPush to commercial → replicate to Assured project
VPC Service ControlsData boundaryPrevents data exfiltration at API level
Private Service ConnectHub → satellitePrivate connectivity
Cloud KMS (FIPS 140-2 L3)Encryption keysHSM-backed keys

True Air-Gap (USB Required — IL5/IL6/SCIF Only)

USB sneakernet is ONLY needed for:

  • IL5/IL6 (Impact Level 5/6) — classified environments
  • SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) — no network at all
  • Submarine/ship — literally disconnected
  • Field deployment — military forward operating base

For these, the USB/ISO bundle from our air-gap policy applies. But this is <1% of FedRAMP deployments.

How This Eases FedRAMP High Certification

What Auditors Check (and How We Pass)

NIST 800-53 ControlWhat Auditors WantWhat We Provide
AC-2 Account managementCentralized identityKeycloak on satellite (own realm, own user store)
AC-17 Remote accessControlled, encryptedPrivateLink / IPsec only — no public internet
AU-2/AU-3 Audit eventsComplete audit trailEvery API call logged, immutable audit table in Citus
CA-3 System interconnectionsDocumented, authorizedHub ↔ satellite ISA documented, only metadata crosses
CM-2 Baseline configReproducible, versionedHelm chart = deterministic, values-fedramp.yaml = config baseline
CM-7 Least functionalityMinimal servicesOnly KuiperDesk services, no extras, network policies enforce
IA-2 IdentificationMFA, unique accountsKeycloak with FIDO2/TOTP, required of every account in a FedRAMP deployment (values-fedramp.yaml); a fresh second factor before privileged dashboard actions; per-agent TPM identity
IA-5 Authenticator mgmtRotation, strengthstep-ca auto-rotates, TPM non-exportable keys
IR-4 Incident handlingRevocation capabilitySatellite CA revocable in < 60s (see PKI trust policy)
MP-4 Media protectionEncrypt removable mediaOnly for IL5+, USB bundle is encrypted + checksummed
PE-17 Alternate work siteRemote backup accessSatellite on customer premises, dashboard accessible locally
PL-4 Rules of behaviorAcceptable useTenant TOS + technical enforcement (network policies)
RA-5 Vulnerability scanningContinuous scanningTrivy on Harbor (pre-deployment), runtime: Tetragon
SA-12 Supply chainProvenance, integrityAll images from Harbor, cosign signed, SBOM available
SC-7 Boundary protectionNetwork boundaryGovCloud VPC + PrivateLink + Cilium network policies
SC-8 Transmission confidentialityEncrypt all transitTLS 1.3 everywhere, FIPS 140-2 validated crypto
SC-12 Crypto key managementFIPS validatedCloudHSM root (Level 3), step-ca FIPS mode, KMS for data
SC-13 Cryptographic protectionFIPS algorithmsAll crypto modules FIPS 140-2 validated
SC-28 Protection at restEncrypt all storageRDS encryption (KMS), S3 SSE-KMS, EBS encryption
SI-7 Software integrityVerified, signedcosign signatures on all images, Helm chart provenance

What We Already Have vs What's Needed

CapabilityStatusNotes
FIPS 140-2 crypto (agent)ReadyAlmaLinux FIPS mode, OpenSSL FIPS provider
FIPS 140-2 crypto (services)ReadyC++ services use FIPS-validated TLS
FIPS 140-2 crypto (CA)ReadyCloudHSM Level 3 root, step-ca FIPS mode
Encryption at restReadyLUKS (bare metal), KMS (cloud), Citus pgcrypto
Encryption in transitReadyTLS 1.3 everywhere, gRPC-over-TLS
Network boundaryReadyCilium policies + GovCloud VPC + PrivateLink
Audit loggingReadyImmutable audit table, OTel export
Vulnerability scanningReadyTrivy + Harbor pre-deployment scan
Image signingReadycosign via Harbor
Identity managementReadyKeycloak + TPM attestation
CA revocationReadyCRL + OCSP + hub blocklist
Satellite isolationReadyPer-satellite intermediate CA, data sovereignty
IaC reproducibilityReadyHelm chart + values file = deterministic baseline
SBOM generationNeededGenerate per-image SBOM (Syft/Trivy)
POA&M trackingNeededPlan of Action & Milestones document
SSP (System Security Plan)NeededThe actual FedRAMP documentation package
3PAO assessmentNeededThird-party assessment by accredited org
Continuous monitoringPartialHave metrics/alerts, need ConMon reporting format

FedRAMP Certification Path

  1. Select sponsor — federal agency willing to use KuiperDesk (ATO sponsor)
  2. Engage 3PAO — accredited assessor (e.g., Coalfire, Schellman, A-LIGN)
  3. Prepare SSP — System Security Plan documenting all 325+ controls
  4. Readiness assessment — 3PAO reviews SSP + architecture
  5. Full assessment — 3PAO tests all controls (penetration test, config review)
  6. Remediate — Fix any findings
  7. Authorization — Agency ATO + FedRAMP PMO listing
  8. Continuous monitoring — Monthly vulnerability scans, annual assessment

Estimated timeline: 6-12 months from engagement to P-ATO
Estimated cost: $300K-$500K (3PAO fees + remediation effort)

Our Architectural Advantages for FedRAMP

  1. Satellite model = clean authorization boundary — customer data never leaves their GovCloud VPC. The hub (commercial) is a separate system with its own SOC 2.
  2. Helm chart = deterministic baseline — CM-2 compliance is trivial: helm template outputs the exact expected state.
  3. step-ca = FIPS crypto we control — no dependency on external CA (Let's Encrypt is NOT FedRAMP authorized).
  4. Per-satellite intermediate CA — SC-12 key management is clean: each satellite has isolated PKI, revocable from hub.
  5. Citus tenant isolation — even within a satellite, data is distributed by tenant_id. Multi-tenant Tier B/C satellites get row-level isolation.
  6. Agent TPM identity — IA-2/IA-5 authenticator management: non-exportable hardware-bound keys, auto-rotating certificates.

Revision History

DateChangeAuthor
2026-03-22Initial — GovCloud deployment, cloud transfer mechanisms, FedRAMP control mapping, certification pathNavid Ahmadi (Compliance), Claire Dubois (Security), Tariq Hassan (Platform)
2026-09-30IA-2: a second factor is required of every account in a FedRAMP deployment (values-fedramp.yaml, compliance.fedramp), #20984Engineering

This document is part of the Arivaran Twin compliance program. For questions or the latest version, contact compliance@arivaran.ai.

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